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Abstract: The following essay was born out of the authors’ participation in the Hamburg 
(Insecurity) Sessions 2019: Un-Cancelling the Future, and the discussions that took place in the 
workshop on Future Weapons and Emerging Technologies. The workshop participants critically 
addressed such problems as the future of defence technologies and their sociotechnical 
environments, cybersecurity and surveillance proliferation, and the improvised instruments of 
insurgency. Our task was to weave the ideas and insights of the workshop’s participants into a 
vision of the world in 2040, and use it to motivate an analysis of the technoscientific imaginaries 
emerging in the present. From the workshop presentations and discussions we identified three 
key areas of that allowed us to imagine the outlines and interactions of global security and 
technoscientific practice in 2040: ecopolitics: the exploitation of ecological systems for strategic 
ends; technonationalism: the use of advanced technologies to pursue racialised and nationalistic 
geopolitical agendas; and the security continuum: the extension of conflict modes to all aspects of 
social life and the open-source proliferation of security tools and techniques.   
 
Keywords: emerging technologies, geopolitics, ecopolitics, technopolitics, future war, 
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 The War for the Future [Title] 
 
Preface: Inventing the Future [Subtitle Level 1] 
The following essay was born out of the authors’ participation in the Hamburg (Insecurity) 
Sessions 2019: Un-Cancelling the Future, and the discussions that took place in the workshop on 
Future Weapons and Emerging Technologies. The workshop participants critically addressed such 
problems as the future of defence technologies and their sociotechnical environments, 
cybersecurity and surveillance proliferation, and the improvised instruments of insurgency. But 
they also grappled with the problems and challenges of imagining the future in an age of acute 
contingency and epistemic crisis. The participants displayed a keen awareness of the emerging 
uncertainties of climate catastrophe, the vexing opacity of global technological assemblages, and 
the ambiguity of geopolitical interactions in an age of information warfare.   
  
     
Our task was to weave the ideas and insights of the workshop’s participants into a vision of the 
world in 2040, and use it to motivate an analysis of the technoscientific imaginaries emerging in 
the present. By combining several scenarios and exaggerating their interactions we hoped to take 
advantage of the inherent uncertainty of the future, using it to tune our imaginations into the 
clues latent in the present. 
 
Geopolitics & Technics in 2040 [Subtitle Level 1]  
From the workshop presentations and discussions we identified three key areas of that allowed us 
to imagine the outlines and interactions of global security and technoscientific practice in 
2040: ecopolitics, technonationalism, and the security continuum. This is a world of stark contrasts, 
unpredictable circumstances, vexed conflicts and inherent contradictions.  
It is our world, only more so.  
   
Ecopolitics [Subtitle Level 2] 
The physical environment in which conflict takes places determines the means employed and the 
ends pursued, and in 2040 environmental constraints are no longer simply factors for strategic 
consideration but are themselves instruments and objects of geopolitical practice. This is the 
context for what we call ecopolitics: geopolitically significant efforts to use technological measures 
to control, manage and secure not only natural resources but entire ecological systems. Such 
strategies act as the conceptual linkages between security governance, technoscientific invention, 
agriculture, military and defence planning, and the computational surveillance of the 
environment. While state and capital interests have always vied for control of nature through 
extractive industries, in 2040 environments and their inhabitants are not only sources of materials 
for production but are both instruments of power and sources of insecurity. As a result, ecological 
practices have become fields of interest and operation for military, security, and intelligence 
services, and their concomitant science and technology industries.   
 
At the planetary level, between 2020 and 2040 temperatures rise sufficiently to melt large ice 
sheets and disrupt ocean currents and their associated jet streams, with serious implications for 
seasonal change, weather patterns and tidal boundaries. Elsewhere, droughts, floods and 
heatwaves are seasonal regularities, while biodiversity loss disrupts planetary ecological 
  
communities. In those places where international conflict over natural resources and food 
insecurity are at their most intense—such as the expanding deserts of the Sahel and Central Asia, 
the heat-belts of the Middle East, or the agricultural pseudo-colonies of Southern Europe—
ecopolitical strategies are used to justify national security policies. Under such conditions, claims 
of necessity and national survival are invoked by desperate or emboldened belligerents alike. As a 
result, contested resources become not only sources of conflict but the very means of warfare, as 
rivers are diverted, water tables drained, crops sabotaged, lakes poisoned, fields stripped and 
forests plundered.  
   
In 2040, under the pressures of climate change and political insecurity, there are continuous flows 
of people, labour and wealth from ecologically disrupted—and mostly post-colonial—areas into 
wealthy countries and their urban centres. Migrations are fuelled by famines and civil wars, or by 
desertification and, increasingly, the drowning of low-lying territories by rising sea levels.  The 
great power nations continue to profit from this disruption, even as they employ their vast 
security apparatuses to contain and control the flow of wealth, people, and political power. 
However, several countries from the global south have taken advantage of the reorganisation of 
global systems to assert control over their natural resources—such as Bolivia with its lithium 
deposits—and are now able to meet superior powers from a position of relative advantage by  
leveraging the scarcity of high-value resources.  
 
To assert control over the complex interactions between natural ecological systems and human 
agricultural industries, some countries increasingly blend environmental sciences with national 
defence and international security. The protection and sustainable exploitation of ecological 
systems has become a priority for most of the Nordic states, and entire landscapes have acquired 
constitutional protections in Costa Rica and the member states of the African Green-Alliance. The 
ongoing saturation of the world with networked devices and computational systems—even as 
parts of it became increasingly uninhabitable—has resulted in the increased efficacy of 
environmental data, and the policies applied to secure and surveil the environment have resulted 
in remote landscapes fully enmeshed with nets of militarized sensors and monitoring systems. In 
some places this has the effect of reducing illegal resource extraction and an increase in the 
volume of data used to develop regenerative ecological policies, while in others it facilitates the 
expansion of invasive surveillance regimes and the normalisation of security politics. However, in 
many places over-reliance on the technoscientific infrastructures of networked society has 
  
resulted in a number of epistemic and pragmatic crises, in which the requisite knowledge and 
action for effective governance is increasingly distanced from the real world and from the lives 
upon which it acts.  
   
Technonationalism [Subtitle Level 2] 
Geopolitical competition over planetary resources and the reactionary insecurities that emerge in 
response to mobile populations have caused many countries to engage in various forms of 
‘technonationalism’, embedding explicitly racialised political agendas into international norms of 
war and security. Science and technology act as both site and driver of chauvinistic identity 
politics, biomedical security assemblages, and zero-sum geopolitical competition. Governments 
with various forms of technonationalist policies and structures—ranging from China to Belarus, or 
the United Kingdom after Scottish independence—employ the vast capabilities of security and 
surveillance to enforce strict control over identity and association, access to social and private 
welfare, and participation in financial and job markets. This has resulted in increased spatial and 
social mobility for those privileged by such systems, and intense precarity and insecurity for those 
without. For those who are categorizedcategorised as problematic, undesirable, or who offer 
resistance —or simply refuse to acquiesce—it has meant intensified discrimination, 
marginalisation and violent oppression.  
   
At the border zones and transitional spaces of technonationalist states, biometric surveillance 
technologies work in tandem with autonomous drone-swarms and other ubiquitous and 
distributed security countermeasures. For such countries practicing bionomic security (biometric + 
genomic) in response to ongoing pandemics, ‘borders’ no longer refer only to international lines 
between states and nations, but to practices of militarised segmentation and 
compartmentalizationcompartmentalisation within national and transnational territories. For 
technonationalists, borders are the spatial logic of the nation-state and are imposed on the whole 
of society. This is why, despite their often low-rates of accuracy and myriad inherent biases, AI-
directed facial recognition and other automated surveillance systems are ubiquitous. However, 
even in countries practising nationalistic governance and isolationist politics, these technological 
security assemblages are tightly intertwined with transnational computational networks that 
facilitate the flow of military and security intelligence, demographic surveillance, ecological and 
environmental data. 
  
  
As a result of both the isolationist policies and technological control, nations embracing illiberal 
forms of governance show increased willingness to use violence against their own populations—
the completion of the multi-decade Chinese genocide project against the UighursUighurs being 
only the most obvious example. Increased aggression towards resistant groups is due, in part, to 
states’ enhanced ability to control the flow of media coverage and public information, which 
prevents any popular outcry and inhibits resistance movements from disseminating their own 
messages and narratives.   
 
The Security Continuum [Subtitle Level 2] 
In 2040, political conflicts and security practices takes place at all levels of means, media and 
materials, while military and defence strategies embrace the very fabric of society and the 
sociotechnical mechanisms of knowledge, consensus and communication.  
   
At the level of planetary scale defence and nuclear capabilities, AI-controlled guidance systems are 
now standard features of intercontinental weapons systems. These pseudo-autonomous systems 
guide the trajectories of long-range hypersonic delivery vehicles, which work in tandem with low-
orbit weapons platforms to combine traditional nuclear weapons with systems designed to disrupt 
global communications networks. This has had the effect of disrupting strategic stability and 
accelerating a latent arms race, but has conversely resulted in the reduction of global nuclear 
stockpiles, as old platforms and systems become technologically obsolete.  
Conventional and unconventional warfare see regular use of small-scale swarms of electronically 
hardened drones and “flying IEDs”. The latter are particularly favoured by insurrectionary 
movements and terrorist organisations and proliferate through additive and low-cost engineering 
technologies, appearing in both criminal and civilian contexts. These autonomous swarms of  
‘flying Faraday cages’ create immense problems both for military forces and civilian populations, 
encouraging the development of advanced electronic warfare and shielding systems designed to 
protect individuals, population centres, and military assets from swarm attacks. This is an arms 
race that continues to evolve.   
 
In addition to the full spectrum of weapons technologies, states with advanced cyber capabilities 
wage continuous campaigns involving the simultaneous sabotage, disruption and manipulation of 
both critical infrastructure and public opinion. Such activities have become fully normalised, both 
as aspects of warfare and armed conflict, as well as means of covertly shaping the broader 
  
international political environment. Conventional warfare and other forms of security operations 
are now accompanied by equivalently scaled information and influence operations, using 
intelligence and information warfare methods aiming to co-opt both mass and elite opinion. 
Media outlets, journalists and the executives of their parent corporations have become priority 
targets of state and non-state intelligence organisations, and in many cases receive levels of 
protection previously reserved for the ultra-wealthy or heads of state.   
   
The deep contradiction of ubiquitous information warfare is that while these strategies of 
manipulation can act as opportunities to explore options in conflicts without resorting to violent 
escalation, they can easily exacerbate conditions to the extent that they result in the kinetic 
escalation of those very conflicts. However, due to the universal vulnerability of software systems, 
and the insecurity of cryptography brought on by the emergence of functional quantum 
computing, political actors see the control of meaning and messaging beyond mere technical 
advantages as essential to their strategic arsenal. Additionally, new forms of decentralised 
financial transaction and low-cost manufacturing shift supply chains towards ever-more complex 
and fragile forms of coordination and logistics, affording new speciations of sabotage, surveillance 
and espionage.   
   
At the societal level, total reliance on information-technological infrastructure has resulted in the 
proliferation and normalisation of cybercrime and offensive cybersecurity in civilian life. This has 
been accompanied by the degradation of privacy rights in most countries and has produced both 
widespread distrust of authority as well as a second-order effect of popularizingpopularising open-
source security measures. While the individual empowerment afforded by information and 
communication technologies has produced an informed and skilled global citizenry, in 
combination with global insecurity it has resulted in the proliferation of surveillance and 
disinformation techniques, not only as political tools but as means of crime and leverage in 
societal relations. The proliferation of parallel shadow-economies and truly anonymous digital 
currencies afford the possibility of both advanced personal privacy measures as well as the 
proliferation of markets for the tools of crime and insurgency.  
   
 
 A History of the Future: 2020 - 2040 [Subtitle Level 1] 
 
  
2020s [Subtitle level 2]  
The geopolitical landscape of the 2020s was composed of several networks of political conflict and 
social insecurity, which emerged as the world began to feel the effects of high temperatures, 
extreme weather events and rising sea levels. States and people faced continuous international 
conflicts and humanitarian crises as a result of resource scarcity, global pandemics, and their 
associated economic destruction. Throughout this period, all forms of political organisation 
worked to expand networks and levers of influence upon the control and mechanics of global 
technological platforms. Economic disparity within and among societies increased vulnerability in 
most places, even as large populations transitioned out of poverty.   
  
Beginning in 2020 and lasting until 2024, several corona-virus pandemics resulted in significant 
damage and reorganisation of the global economy, pushing wealthy countries towards increased 
automation and hybrid systems of social-welfare and privatised governance, while disadvantaged 
countries suffered massive setbacks in terms of education, development and economic 
independence. The pandemics also accelerated techno-scientific research into biomedical 
technologies with security applications, such as serological passporting, full bionomic identity 
databases, and the development of AI surveillance algorithms trained on gait and postural data, to 
overcome the widespread normalisation of face-covering masks. 
 
At some point between 2028 and 2030, almost every person on the earth became connected in 
some way to the internet. The subsequent empowerment of the individual (and the communal) 
brought on by universal information access and decentralised supply and manufacturing brought 
many changes impacting security issues, in particular the emergence of effective and transnational 
peace movements combining the network effects of universal connectivity with the 
communicative skills of educated and politically sophisticated coalitions across post-colonial and 
settler communities. 
 
However, the risks of universal connectivity were highlighted by the Russian cyberattacks against 
Georgia during the 2029 border conflict, which became known as the ‘world’s first cyber war’. In 
the midst of a covert military buildup, Russian cyber operators targeted electrical grids, hospitals, 
government facilities, university and scientific databases, industrial control systems, and even 
networks of personal computers. Through a combination of espionage and computer network 
attacks, disinformation campaigns and indiscriminately destructive malware, IT infrastructure all 
  
across the country was exploited, corrupted and in many cases destroyed. The cyberattack was 
the first in history known to have resulted in the loss of life, caused untold destruction of value 
and vital information, and was ultimately the triggering event for a border war that resulted in 
Russian annexation of Georgian territory.  
   
The other significant geopolitical event of the 2020s was the escalation of the conflict between the 
coastal states that claim territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. Competing interests over 
access to resources, national prestige and geopolitical influence were brought to a head with the 
introduction of both new technologies and new tactics. First amongst these was the disruption of 
global trade and supply chains by using autonomous underwater weapons systems to close or 
deny straits and sea lanes through adaptibleadaptable and only partially detectable blockades, a 
tactic developed and perfected by the Chinese military and used to great geopolitical effect. Their 
ability to use relatively cheap autonomous weapons platforms to disrupt global maritime security 
gave the Chinese the upper hand in their negotiations with the other claimants to the territorial 
disputes, and forced the other nations of the world to accede to their demands for territorial 
recognition, or face a trade and supply crisis.  
 
2030s [Subtitle level 2] 
After disruptions of the 20s the shifting configuration of international conflict settled into an 
uneasy assemblage of traditional alliances and competition, economic and technological 
entanglement, constant and antagonistic cyber and information warfare, grinding infra-state and 
transnational civil conflicts, and sporadic great power confrontations; a state of ‘hanging on’ 
rather than ‘hanging together’.  
   
During this period, the density, intensity and acceleration of planetary-scale computation in many 
instances reorganised the balance of power and caused dramatic reversals of formerly stable 
political relationships, such as between labour and capital. The most obvious effect was the 
emergence of public-private alliances that reconfigured the role of both state and capital 
institutions in international politics. In several cases, vital governance functions (military, 
education, medical) were given over to private consortiums in order to avoid state collapse, while 
in others it was a combination of the private sector’s exploitation of weak governments and a 
logical evolution of neoliberal economic policy. Thus the geopolitical landscape completed the 
shift from post-Cold War unipolarity to an asymmetric global multipolarity, with hegemony shared 
  
between, negotiated and parcelled out between several great power states and their security 
alliances (Five Eyes/Fourteen Eyes, Belt and Road Security Community, Balkan Defence Initiative, 
Nordic-Baltic Defence Alliance), which compete both amongst each other and with emerging 
associations of states and corporate entities (Central Asian Mining Bloc, Pan-African Resource 
Corporation, Canadian-Arctic Energy Consortium, South Asian Information Alliance). These latter 
groupings emerged during the shipping and logistics crises that were a result of the Silk Road 
resource wars and the logistics conflicts in the Arabian Gulf and the South China Sea.  By 2040 
they had come to control a political sphere of influence in countries where state governance had 
failed, and so legitimate authority and regional hegemony is assured through a symbolic state-
form, while capital, technological and information power are provided by corporate interests.  
 
The parallel and antidote to this process was the emergence of independent state-like movements 
that focused on collective social-wellbeing and ecological management. This was most prominent 
in the Middle East, where disruptions to the previous status quo afforded the emergence of the 
Kurdish Free State of Rojava, a social-ecologist confederation practicing permaculture and acting 
as a stabilizingstabilising actor for regional security; and in the Central American Ecological 
Confederation, an alliance of states and regions that have utilizedutilised smart-agricultural 
practices, shared data-markets and expansive security cooperation to resist the predations of both 
PanamericanPan-American narco-organisations and American agricultural conglomerates. 
   
The most recent and still ongoing field of geopolitical transformation was the great power 
competition that emerged in the rapidly thawing arctic, which, beginning in 2035, became a 
fiercely contested frontier as both the Northern and Northwest Passages became free of ice for 
large periods of time, opening up new colonial-military projects for natural resources and 
international influence. This ongoing conflict has drawn in Nordic countries with territorial claims 
to the Arctic, such as Norway and Finland, as well as the USA and Russia. 2036 saw skirmishes and 
border clashes between Nordic and Russian armed forces, involving predominantly special forces 
and unconventional units, but also artillery and mechanised units. Constant mutual surveillance 
and attempts at sabotage maintain a heightened sense of crisis, which, in combination with the 
aggressive rhetoric of the nuclear-armed states and their allies, threatens even greater 
insecurity. In 2038, in combination with a decades-long arms race, the crisis has resulted in both 
the USA and Russia deploying orbital, hypersonic weapons, with the added 
  
destabilizingdestabilising variable of targeting and guidance systems partially operated by artificial 
intelligence. Thus, nuclear warfare once again became a clear and present danger. 
  
The Future Present [Subtitle level 2] 
Most of these events and upheavals took place not as clearly defined eruptions of violence but as 
escalations or deteriorations of complex political, ecological and sociotechnical processes. 
However, looking back at the history of the world we have created it is obvious that for many of 
these transformations there were a number of alternative options available to those in positions 
of power, and that the paths chosen were often those affording expedience, convenience, and 
relative advantage. This was result of the tendency—particularly in the West—to choose and 
cultivate strategic and technoscientific imaginaries that prioritise the control of present sources of 
power and efficacy over more long-term perspectives. For the future we can only hope that the 
means of science, technology and security will be considered not only in terms of their immediate 
benefit for strategic calculus, but in their wider implications for the ecological systems and social 
processes in which they unfold. 
 
The Performative Power of  Technological Vision(s) [Subtitle level 1]  
 
 The scientific revolutions of the past decades have unquestionably conditioned our present 
(2020) existence, though their extent, effect and geographical distribution has not always 
been immediately apparent.  What has become clear, however, is that where power is situated in 
defining our present socio-technological relations, and how it manifests in our futures, is 
effectively disguised by political narratives that depict these progressions as linear and 
deterministic. Geopolitical hierarchies tend to materialise in the shape of technological 
capabilities, affording for some the control from the nano to the global level via means 
of genetic, ecological and geoengineering, global communication networks, or the destructive 
power of evermore disruptive weapons systems. As a result, the question of who wins or suffers 
from these technoscientific advances is often sidelined and naturalised through prevailing modes 
of assessment. Vulnerabilities such as challenges of representation in, or recognition 
through, technological design and practice are hidden behind regimes of complexity.  This 
tendency is ubiquitous in modern practices of algorithmic warfare (Wilcox 2017), biometric and 
border technologies (Csernatoni 2018; Kloppenburg and van der Ploeg 2020) as well as in 
the medical and life sciences (Mehta et al. 2019).   
  
 
 As a pervasive tool of human practice, technology has and continues to transform the material 
conditions of modern societies. Concordantly, along with technology “the imagination of power 
and progress in contemporary social life” also changes (Hurlbut and Tirosh-Samuelson 2016: 
117). It is this centrality of technoscience and its strategic construction and interpretation in 
political discourses that we have sought to outline in this exercise, as these processes are already 
and will likely remain the sites of international competition and political contestation.    
  
The often criticised incursion of security logics, discourses, actors and practices into social, health, 
and technological realms thereby risks exacerbating existing inequalities within and among 
societies but also between contemporary and future generations as well as in human/non-
human relationships. We argue that these technoscientific security regimes are and will be a 
dominating factor for the trajectory of our collective futures. They are realised not only materially 
but through particular modes of contemporary thinking about problems and their solutions that 
centre on or are mediated through technology and science - and our understanding of 
them. Touching as much on matters of war(fare) and national defence as on the design and 
possibilities of healthcare, communication, mobility, government or the state of our environment 
and climate, technoscientific security regimes have permeated the borders of war and peace, 
coproducing evermore unbounded theatres of conflict and an expanded battlespace.1  
 
They come to matter in the reconfiguration of security practices, the construction of expertise, 
understandings of subjectivity and the notion of rights as scholars such Claudia Aradau, Tobias 
Blanke (2018), Trine Villhumsen Berger, Christian Bueger (2015) and Alexander Mankoo (2018) 
among others have critiqued. But beyond shaping the modes of the present, these processes 
of co-production have been intimately connected to ‘the future’ – what it ought to be and whom it 
is for. Yet the appeal to understand the future through technoscience remains a common trope 
that Hannah Arendt already cautioned against more than fifty years ago. Replacing all 
eschatological and moral notions with particular ideas of technoscientific progress for the future, 
devoid of history and the realm of experiences, yet preoccupied with the idea of human 
improvement, such a future was empty, senseless and ultimately impossible (Arendt, 1961).  
  
                                                 
1 In The Scientific Way of Warfare, Antoine Bousquet (2009) an illustrative analysis of this entanglement epitomized in 
modern practices of warfare and hegemonic technoscientific epistemes. 
  
Technoscientific Imaginaries & the Future [Subtitle Level 2] 
In 2020, we again observe how advances in science and technology promise the consummation of 
the historical fantasy of human mastery over nature’s inherent unpredictability, particularly with 
regard to ‘emerging technologies’. Trends in innovation thereby raise both new and old questions 
about how to control technology for international security, the practice of science more 
generally and its agenda for progress (Edwards, 2019). Strategic visions and technoscientific 
imagination co-evolve in forms of weapons technology, but also in the regimes and infrastructures 
of data analytics and surveillance or genetic and ecological engineering approaches. We see the 
aestheticizingaestheticising of artificial intelligence and human-machine teaming that seduces us 
to believe in the abolition of conflict, climate catastrophe, and disease through technological 
mastery (c.f. Elbe and Roberts, 2016). A technological awe is again palpable,  similar to that seen 
at the beginnings of the nuclear project uniting scientists at Los Alamos and of the Manhattan 
project for a brief moment in the belief that nuclear weapons would render war obsolete (Masco, 
2017).   
  
Such reflections on past national-strategic projects can offer a lens through which to comprehend 
the workings of the technological-cultural complex in pursuit of security. At its centre remains a 
dilemma in which, by the very reality of ever more sophisticated military technologies of 
destruction, the very purpose of these measures—ie the pursuit of security—is 
compromised (Masco, 2006).  
 
Today’s technologies—like Penrose stairs—project these strategic logics into the 
future through the ways that we make security knowable and enforceable. For example, the 
promises of big data, enabled through globally interlinked surveillance 
regimes, nourish anticipations that just “more data” can act as a panacea to our 
contemporary political and societal uncertainties. In the process of the “delegation of 
thought” (Leander and Waever 2019: 4) to machines in the analysis and interpretation of our 
social world we seemingly adapt the question of (in)security to the technical processes that are 
developed. This “cult of discreetness” eagerly reduces to an instant what is actually “a process and 
movement, rhythm and relation” to the detriment of those sitting in-between, “those more subtle 
connections or resonances whose effects are felt but not discrete are overshadowed by those 
relations we can chart and measure” (ibid) as Jairus Grove (2019: 62) recently critiques.  
 
  
The COVID-19 pandemic exemplifies the chimeric nature of these security technologies: the goal 
of globally managing the virus spurred the regimes of surveillance and data mining developed for 
counterterrorism to find new applications. These technologies, “sitting deep within our agencies 
as a tantalizingtantalising security tool that may become the best means we have of tracking this 
new ‘invisible enemy’” (Doffman, 2020), are empowered through the ‘uncanny rhetoric of 
‘war’ (c.f. Draghi, 2020), which has the effect of postponing much of the necessary scrutiny as to 
their appropriateness, wider ramifications, and even effectiveness (Mudde, 2020).  
 
Demonstrating their ubiquitous utility, these all-encompassing regimes of monitoring, tracking, 
and policing are here to stay. Civil-military and dual-use projects thereby play into understandings 
of a security continuum between internal and external security that accelerate 
strategic international competition in high-tech Research and Development (R&D). The enemy 
thereby shifts forms and wanders between the dimensions of the global to the 
microscopic, from global climate change (Rothe, 2016), to terrorist organisations, viruses (Elbe, 
2014) and eventually even single base-pairs of our DNA that are causing hereditary diseases. Each 
is understood to require a technological solution.  
  
Techno-nationalism [Subtitle Level 2] 
Achieving and maintaining national leadership in strategic technologies consequently appears as 
an unquestionable necessity that transforms geopolitical agendas and the ways knowledge, ideas, 
materials, and skills circulate. Some see concerning resemblances with the arms races and 
the weaponisation of science and technology that took place during the Cold War (Fink, 
2020; Lodgaard 2019). One clear parallel is that the alignment of strategic and security interests 
with the promises of high-tech and civil-military projects (Csernatoni, 2018) reduces transparency 
about the intentions of national investment into these “disruptive” technologies (Edwards, 2019).  
 The field of (Global) Health again provides for illustration of comprehensive civil-military 
collaboration and the entanglement of research projects, expertise, grants, and discourses. 
The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for instance, led decades-long efforts 
across public and private sectors (such as the pharmaceutical company Merck & Co., Inc., non-
governmental and international organisations) to develop the vaccine Ervebo® against the Ebola 
Virus Disease (EVD) (Gardner, 2020). The vast knowledge, data, and 
research infrastructure allowing the development of the EVD vaccine, the eradication 
of smallpox, as well as treatment to other infectious diseases such as polio are no coincidence 
  
but are a product of the extensive strategic interests of Western military institutions in biological 
weapons/threats throughout (modern) history (Geissler et al, 1999).  
 
Consequently, the funding of and research into orphan diseases such as 
Ebola through (Western) state agencies such as the military in and of itself is neither new nor is 
it only problematic. Given the embeddedness of healthcare in the market economy, state funding 
into rare diseases even serves a crucial function to keep eradicating or treating non-domestically 
prevalent diseases on the agenda of resourceful pharmaceutical research 
(companies). Similarly, the 2014-2015 military operation ‘United Assistance’ during the 
humanitarian crisis and Ebola epidemic in West-Africa, foremost in Liberia, allowed the crucial 
logistic support of the Centre of Disease Control (CDC) as well as the allocation of 
vast resources towards a public health response (Kamradt-Scott et al. 2015).  
  
 The other side of the coin, however, presents itself as an amalgamation of strategic, economic, 
and defensedefence research interests that is spurring international mistrust. The 
U.S. Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) and its project “Insect Allies” for 
instance recently sparked suspicion about its officially stated purpose to enhance agricultural 
production, when the underlying technology also suits itself as a potent biological weapon (Reeves 
and Voeneky et al. 2019). Meanwhile, much of the mainstream European and Western critique of 
the expansion of the security continuum has focused on China’s national agenda for military-civil 
fusion (see for instance Kania 2017). Projected into the near to medium-term future, these trends 
will have a significant impact on the workings of democratic governance in its attempt to guide 
technological development according to its political commitments. Democratic states should be 
wary of becoming complicit in fostering these dangerous and often mutually reinforcing 
accelerations of geopolitical competition. Critical engagement with (the drivers of) these 
‘domestic’ projects thereby is not to be mistaken as moral relativism, but a call for caution that 
European and US defence research projects equally can spur international competition, secrecy 
and mistrust exactly over those projects for which public deliberation would be central yet are put 
aside over fears to lose the strategic advantage.   
  
As long as technoscientific influences on security regimes are considered to be merely neutral and 
enabling rather than affording and creating path dependence, the strategic choices of state 
agencies and powerful non-state actors can hide behind conceptions of (technoscientific) 
  
‘emergence’. Cut loose from the incremental steps leading to inventions and the generation of 
knowledge, these narrations evoke ideas of the inevitability of technology and the linearity (or 
singularity) of technology-induced progress. Hidden in this technocratic line of reasoning are the 
ways our terms of reference and debate become trapped in sequences of tokenised 
frameworks that neglect substantive discussion as to whether any alternative means are 
available. Andy Stirling (2018) recently critiques:   
 
 the choices for innovation are restricted to the balancing of “risk” and “benefit” 
in some singular and supposedly inevitable direction for advance. Too often, the 
issues are reduced simplistically to a spectrum from “forging ahead” to “falling 
behind”, as if the direction were predetermined or self-evident  (Stirling, 2018 7-
8).  
 
The view of alternative fields of technological production and meaning-making helps us to 
recognise where power and hierarchy is situated in its construction. An increasing interest in Do-It-
Yourself (DIY) and Citizen Science broadens the application of science according to individual or 
community needs. While DIY science, as well as the notion of the ‘democratisation’, has regularly 
been associated with proliferation concerns and terrorism (Clapper, 2016), crowd-funded projects 
such as ‘Open Insulin’ (Burningham, 2019) and the growth of open-source information security 
knowledge, demonstrate efforts to challenge the gatekeeper role of traditional actors. This has 
impacts upon definition of scientific and technological objectives and their influence in the 
production and circulation of essential technologies. The outlook of enhanced production of local 
products thereby adds to the variety of technological options available in the future, allowing 
customers to choose between options and expand the technoscientific literacy. It corrects those 
claims for technology’s determinist effects on society by acknowledging “not that technology 
develops outside of human agency, but that it develops outside of some humans’ agencies” 
(McCarthy, 2013: 476). That is, attempting to understand the symbolical and material 
power of technoscientific projects through their embeddedness in and coproduction through 
socio-political relations.   
  
 Where Do We Go from Here? [Subtitle Level 1] 
Thus far we have illustrated a dominant theme of the present that underlies the future we 
imagined at the opening of this piece:  the opaque, competitive and often naive political discourse 
on technoscientific developments elides the complex political and strategic issues generated by 
  
technological invention. Whereas our outlined future may – or most likely may not – come true, 
our contribution is to make the future thinkable and thereby consciously changeable.2   
  
 Meanwhile, large technological projects—such as those of the nuclear age and the emerging 
fields of genetic design—struggle with their “unthinkability” (Masco, 2006: 3), even as their 
development and concomitant investment renders them seemingly necessary and 
inevitable. Their effects, for different reasons, appear too overwhelming and radical to be 
comprehended within and through the everyday. They appear as the subjects of science fiction or 
in the form of news reports on scientific ‘breakthroughs‘ that spark awe and wonder rather 
than a thorough debate about their socio-political embeddedness. Although not a novel 
phenomenon, such understandings render us unable (or unwilling) to critically steer technological 
developments at the time of their emergence. Yet the situation is not all doom and gloom: the 
nuclear age has also demonstrated opportunities to spark discourses about vulnerability and 
insecurity. These can form starting points for emancipatory agendas that refocus the terms of 
progress from the centrality of the machine to the quality of everyday life and the fragility of the 
human body and the virtues of sociopolitical interdependence.    
  
Although the tech-sector is temporarily under the spotlight of public attention and scrutiny 
within the political debate, it is unclear if and how this might relate to deeper changes in the 
relationship between innovation and democratic institutions. Part of the problem is the way tat 
social inquiry into technology is structured, and how ‘the problem of technology’ is perceived and 
articulated. As we noted above, technological vision is performative. Yet the predicament we see 
is also a shortcoming of contemporary political engagement with public administrations dealing 
with emerging technologies.  
 
Big tech companies such as Amazon, Google/Alphabet, and Facebook have started 
to acknowledge their significant role in core political processes such as democratic elections and 
the formation of political opinion (i.e. “The corporate responsibility to protect” (MSC, 2020)). Yet 
parliamentary inquiries (i.e. UK Parliament Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and 
Sport (2018)) highlight the lack of robust political-legal foundation that defines these 
companies’ responsibilities towards the public. This is a topic that increasingly figures on the 
                                                 
2  It thereby deviates from methodological approaches such as Delphi method-informed Horizon Scanning that aim to 
systematically (and accurately) identify upcoming opportunities or threats from technological, regulatory or socio-
political changes (Sackmann, 1975; Sutherland and Woodroof, 2009). 
  
political agenda, and Silicon Valley elites themselves should consider the professionalisation of 
their political representation, as was suggested during the 2020 Munich Security Conference 
by a Member of the US Congress.3 Absent of internal consultation and coordination, both political 
decision-makers and the tech-sector hinder fruitful exchange of expertise and 
experience supporting regulation, but also safeguards against misuse or adverse scenarios.  
  
Recent interest in how both innovations and unconscious biases emerge in technological 
features has contributed to a wider awareness about who participates in the process of 
technological design, and the many ways that vulnerabilities, exclusion, racism, sexism, 
etc. materialise in our (technological) institutions. As a result of the critical interrogations of these 
dynamics we can observe the importance not only of professional expertise but also the value 
of ‘lay’ knowledge in considerations of how we might achieve a meaningful ‘democratisation’ of 
technology. A thoughtful account of the relationship between expertise, lay knowledge, and the 
means of participation in the technical sphere has been advocated by scholars in the field of 
science and technology studies and philosophy of technology. Such enquires have as their premise 
the idea that agency neither is nor ought to be limited to expert groups, but ought to be, as 
suggested by Feenberg (2017), available to individuals through their interaction with and 
experience of technologies and associated systems. The socio-technical relationship he describes 
is thereby both co-productive and the result of an “entangled hierarchy”, in which social groups on 
the one hand “exist through the technologies that bind their members together”, yet through this 
membership also gain power over technological developments, “through their choices and 
protests.“ Controversies surrounding Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) – and their use in 
agriculture and farming – especially within societies of EU Member States, have demonstrated 
that public intervention can alter technological institutions, their codes, practices, and 
regulations. Undoubtedly, such interventions remain structured by and embedded in pre-existing 
norms and economic interests, which for instance have formed European sensitivities over the 
desirability of human intervention into nature (Felt 2015). Nevertheless, they also point to the 
potency of public deliberation in creating and maintaining these norms to change both the design 
and application of technological artefacts.  
  
                                                 
3 Comment by U.S. Congress Member Elissa Slotkin during a Townhall debate on the Future of Disinformation, Munich 
Security Conference 15th February 2020.   
  
For security, public participation comes to matter in light of increasing trends of dual-use and civil-
military collaboration, for instance, promoted within the European Horizon 2020 
framework. Agendas such as ‘Responsible Research Innovation’ imitative promoted within 
the same framework could foster both the ethical understanding of those at the forefront of 
technological innovation as well as public deliberation over the political ends (and means) of dual-
use innovation. Controversies over US DoD’s Project Maven (ICRC, 2018; Weisgerber, 
2018) furthermore uncovered the unease the convergence of private technical expertise and 
capacity with national strategic interests unleashes, demonstrated with the political mobilisation 
of Google’s tech workers.4 These events uncovered both essential discrepancies in innovation 
cultures between the Silicon Valley enterprises and traditional security contractors, but also 
pointed to the strategies deployed by the US DoD since to unite innovation capabilities in line 
with the ‘national interest’.       
  
On this point, yet coming from a different angle, several governance initiatives exist that seek to 
break down barriers between sectors, areas of expertise, and skillsets to enable multinational and 
public-private cooperation. Such initiatives for instance found in the field of disarmament and 
responsible innovation/science ethics aim to foster collective capabilities across traditional 
security boundaries in areas such as Life Sciences, Physics and Chemistry that have a long tradition 
of science-led peace initiatives institutionalised in organisations such as Pugwash. Julian Perry 
Robinson contended about two decades ago on the rationale of this activism emerging in the 
aftermath of the use of nuclear weapons:   
  
Scientists have always had to contend with what has been called their “double 
loyalty”: a sense of duty not only to their country but also to their science. In 
some disciplines, this duality could be conflictual, and, during those early years of 
the “national security state”, it was indeed for more and more people. Loyalty to 
science is an abstraction not easily described or understandable outside its 
world. In some scientists it is nonexistent, but in others, it is passionate, 
overriding. Maybe it has to do with the desire to protect newborn knowledge 
from deformation, from distraction, from loss, from waste. Maybe it also has to 
do with the belief that science is for the common good (Robinson, 1998: 5).  
 
 
These sentiments since have evoked great progress in terms of ethical sensibilities as well as the 
creation of strong norms in the conduct of science. In the field of Synthetic Biology and Genome 
Editing initiatives such as iGEM (International Genetically Engineered Machines competition) have 
                                                 
4  In a similar vein, employees of Microsoft prominently have held the company to account for its collaboration with 
the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement to process data and artificial intelligence capabilities (Frenkel 2018). 
  
been established to foster ‘good practice’ and norm building surrounding principles of responsible 
research innovation. It successfully incorporates actors from different sectors 
(i.e. academia, the Do-It-Yourself Community, and security bureaucracies), but also importantly 
generations to collaborate and exchange on the state-of-the-art in Synthetic Biology but also 
to generate trust among the different sectors. As a governance model for other emerging 
technologies, iGEM has successfully integrated adaptive risk management approaches that speak 
both to the potential social-political problems the life sciences could contribute to while being in 
dialogue with different stakeholders from early one. For instance, in 
2018, iGEM started the collaboration with regulators and experts to develop a risk assessment 
tool for its teams, whereas it achieves educational goals in requiring teams “to identify and 
describe the procedures, practices, or containment measures they will use to manage the risks 
they identify” (Millet et al. 2019).   
  
These initiatives, themselves a model for intersectional collaboration in a fast-
changing technological environment are increasingly embedded in conceptual reconsiderations 
about how regulatory decisions are made beyond normative models of how they ought 
to. Pragmatist approaches as such of Charles Lindblom (1959, 1979) for instance suggest attending 
to practices of “muddling through” – acknowledging how decision-makers (need to) align 
conflicting perspectives and priorities when information is in short supply or contradictory. These 
conundrums are central to decisions on how and when initial experiments of governance are 
worth scaling-up. This is of importance for international attempts at achieving greater 
harmonisation in regulatory landscapes. It is this plural field of actors, skillsets, generations, and 
geographies that offer the alternative and plural reading frames necessary to ‘uncancel’ our 
predetermined technological future and to allow inclusiveness for the visions of those sitting in 
between the dominant paradigms, and whose visions have too often been neglected and 
rendered invisible.    
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